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Closure and Rational Belief 
Simon J. Evnine, Miami 
What kinds of principles belong in a theory of rational 
belief? One contention of this paper is that it is impossible 
to reach informed conclusions about the answer to this 
question without a clear sense of what such a theory is 
intended to do. It may be rejoined that such a theory is 
always, at least, intended to cash out, in perspicuous 
terms, the notion of rationality, and hence no further 
context is needed to try and decide what principles belong 
in the theory. This will not do: use of the term ‘rationality’ is 
so multi-faceted that it is doubtful whether there is a single 
concept that it picks out. In fact, specifying what a theory of 
rationality is intended to do may go hand in hand with 
providing a characterization of one notion (out of many) of 
rationality. This will prove to be the case in the following. 
A second, and in fact the major, contention of this paper 
is to argue for some particular closure principles for 
rational belief. I will, following my own advice above, 
supply a use for a theory of rational belief against which 
my discussion will take place. I will identify very strong, 
and very weak views about closure and argue that, against 
the background of the use of the theory that I have in 
mind, they both fail. I will then argue for a position 
somewhere in between. 
One - I do not claim the only - task of a theory of rational 
belief is to enable us to interpret others. By interpreting 
others, I mean being able to explain and predict their 
actions by attributing various mental states to them. A 
number of philosophers have argued that the best way to 
do this is to assume that the interpreted other is rational, 
and to ascribe to her mental states that make her actions 
rational. A theory of rational belief can play an essential 
role in this process. Of course it cannot be anywhere near 
the whole story since, by definition, it concerns only belief 
and no other mental states. But belief is generally admitted 
to be especially important among mental states and, along 
with desire, is often taken as the main ingredient of an 
interpretation of someone. Sometimes, when we are 
interpreting someone, we have direct evidence for the 
presence or absence of a given belief. The person, for 
example, asserts, or denies, that p. Often, however, we 
wish to ascertain whether someone believes, or does not 
believe, something when we have no direct evidence. It is 
in such cases that a theory of rational belief will be of vital 
importance. Since we will have direct evidence for the 
presence or absence of other beliefs, the assumption that 
the person being interpreted is rational will allow us to use 
a theory of rational belief to extend our interpretation into 
areas for which we do not have direct evidence. This 
picture provides the background against which I will now 
discuss various approaches to closure. 
Closure principles come in different strengths. Strong 
closure is expressed thus: 
(SC) A set of rational beliefs S is such that, for any finite 
subset T of S, if T⎬b, then b belongs to S. 
By contrast, weak closure requires only: 
(WC) A set of rational beliefs S is such that, for any 
member a of S, if a⎬b, then b belongs to S. 
The difference is that, by weak closure, a set of rational 
beliefs contains what is logically implied by any of its 
members taken by itself, whereas by strong closure, a 
rational belief set contains what is implied by any its 
members taken with each other. Those attempting to 
provide formal theories of rational belief have typically 
adhered to one or another form of closure. 
Against the background of interpretation, both of these 
principles seem much too permissive. Even (WC) would 
license us in attributing to someone many beliefs that 
would either have no bearing on explaining and predicting 
her behavior, or would be positively misleading, bringing 
us to expect actions that were never performed or not 
expect ones that were. As a special sub-problem of this 
variety, (WC) might well lead us to attribute beliefs to 
someone that she positively abjured, thus coming into 
conflict with our direct evidence. 
Many people have argued thus against (WC) or (SC) 
and several weaker alternatives have been suggested. A 
modest alternative is to require closure of rational belief 
under believed implication: 
(BC) A set of rational beliefs S is such that, for any 
members a,b,c... of S, if it is believed that a,b,c...⎬d, then 
d belongs to S. 
This does well in dealing with the problems that beset (SC) 
and (WC), but it faces problems of its own, owing now to 
its weakness. The underlying problem is that it severs the 
link between belief and rationality, as this link serves the 
goal of attributing beliefs to a subject in interpretation. We 
cannot assume that just because a,b,c... do imply d that a 
subject believes that, nor that, given that a subject 
believes that a,b,c... imply d that they really do. The 
interpreter thus cannot use a knowledge of logical relations 
to extend the beliefs she can attribute to a subject without 
some well-grounded beliefs about the subject’s beliefs 
about what implies what. Such beliefs about implication 
are highly theoretical and unlikely to be forthcoming in 
many cases. We therefore risk ending up with a theory that 
simply cannot do the job it is designed for. 
A more extreme response to the failures of traditional 
closure is adumbrated by Christopher Cherniak (1986). 
Cherniak argues that which logical abilities a creature has 
is determined by its psychology, but that there is no 
necessary connection between rationality and any 
particular type of psychology. Hence, equally rational 
creatures may, owing to their different psychologies, have 
very different (possibly non-overlapping) sets of logical 
abilities. As a consequence, Cherniak argues that there 
can be no theory of rational belief that is a priori suitable 
for all creatures that we might wish to interpret. The only 
‘closure’ rule that applies to a rational creature per se is 
that it believes some of the consequences of its beliefs. 
Nothing more specific can be said. The only way to supply 
a more detailed theory for interpretation is to rely on a 
theory that details the specific psychology of the creature 
to be interpreted. 
The real weakness of this approach is masked by the 
fact that it may well be true that all normally developed, 
adult human beings do share the relevant psychological 
features, and that such creatures are, as it happens, the 
only ones with which we are acquainted that are plausible 
candidates for interpretation. It could even be argued 
(though Cherniak does not) that humans have innate 
access to the type of psychological theory necessary for 
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interpretation (on his view), or that we can easily - if with 
some inductive weakness - obtain it by extrapolation from 
our own cases. But even among normally developed, adult 
humans, there are strong linguistic and cultural differences 
and it has been urged that these differences extend to 
differences in logical abilities. For Cherniak’s approach to 
be generally useful in human interpretation, such relativism 
must be answered at the empirical level, something that a 
theory that genuinely dealt with rationality per se would not 
have to do. And of course, should there turn out to be non-
human rational beings, there would not even be a prima 
facie reason for thinking, on Cherniak’s view, that we could 
use knowledge of logical relations to extend our belief 
attributions beyond those for which we had direct 
evidence. If we had direct evidence for such a creature’s 
believing the conjunction p and q, there would be no 
justification, absent an appropriate psychological theory, 
for assuming that it believes p. 
I come now to my proposals. We should start by thinking 
about what kind of creatures should fall within the scope of 
a theory of rational belief if it is to be used for the purposes 
of interpretation. Clearly, such creatures must be rational, 
but we need to say more about what this means, since, as 
noted, the concept has been so diversely used. Here, 
then, are some conditions, individually necessary but not 
claimed to be jointly sufficient for one conception of 
rationality that is tied to the project of interpretation. 
I propose that a rational creature must a) be capable of 
intentional action, and hence of deliberation. b) It must be 
able to develop and modify, in response to information 
received piecemeal, some conception of a unified world of 
which it is a part. c) It must recognize the (at least 
potential) existence of other creatures with their own 
representations of the world, and hence have a concept of 
belief, and therefore concepts of truth and falsity. 
It must be said that these conditions add up to both a 
meager and a stringent conception of rationality. Stringent, 
in that normally-developed humans are very likely the only 
example with which we are acquainted of creatures 
meeting these conditions. Meager, in that the conditions 
are clearly and obviously met by all such humans, that 
they do not exhaust all that could be said of the rationality 
of such humans, and in that any type of being that had 
anything remotely similar to human culture (that could 
sustain any forms of art, technology and social institutions) 
would surely have to meet them. 
I have argued at length elsewhere (Evnine 2001) that 
satisfaction of these conditions entails the possession of 
certain particular logical abilities. I shall not repeat the 
arguments here, though of course they form an essential 
piece of the position I am working out here about closure 
requirements. Here is a list of the inferential abilities 
entailed by satisfaction of the conditions that are relevant 
to our present purposes: 
a) possession of a concept of conjunction subject to the 
usual introduction and elimination rules; 
b) possession of at least one of any concept of condi-
tionality that is subject to modus ponens. 
(Some of the conditions on rationality support logical 
abilities that are not inferential in nature, and that are con-
nected with consistency conditions on rational belief.) It is 
on the basis of these ‘universal’ logical abilities that we can 
formulate a principle of closure that occupies a middle 
ground between the overly strong and overly weak 
versions we have rejected: 
(Closure) If S is a set of rational beliefs, then i) for any 
pair of beliefs {a,b} in S, a and b is in S; ii) for any belief 
a and b in S, a is in S and b is in S; iii) for any pair of 
beliefs {a, if a then b} in S, b is in S. 
(Closure) requires, thus, not universal closure under 
entailment, but closure only under conjunction (elimination 
and introduction) and modus ponens. It is weaker than 
either (SC) or (WC), but unlike (BC), it preserves a 
genuine link with logic, in allowing the attribution of (some) 
beliefs to someone merely on the grounds that they follow 
logically from other beliefs that person has. And unlike 
Cherniak’s view, (Closure) is independent of any psycho-
logical theory, being tied only to satisfaction of the highly 
general conditions contained in the characterization of 
rationality. 
In the remainder, I will mention two objections to (Clo-
sure), one specific, the other general. Specifically, clause i) 
of (Closure) requires that a rational person’s beliefs be 
closed under conjunction introduction. This particular 
aspect of closure has received a lot of criticism independ-
ent of the general problems for closure conditions that we 
looked at above, criticism centered around the Lottery and 
Preface paradoxes, which are purported to show that 
closure of belief under conjunction introduction will lead to 
irrationality, even to the violation of the weak (WC). I have 
addressed these objections elsewhere (Evnine 1999). I will 
say here only this. The requirement expresses the view 
that all our beliefs should be open to rational interaction 
with each other; that we should not, in other words, 
compartmentalize our beliefs. In the context of interpreta-
tion, I believe this assumption is the default one - when we 
interpret, we initially assume that we can bring to bear on 
our interpretations any other beliefs we have reason to 
attribute to the person whom we are interpreting. There 
are, of course, special occasions when this default 
assumption must be modified. The theory of rationality of 
which the condition of closure under conjunction introduc-
tion is a part may thus be said to yield a theory of prima 
facie interpretation rather than interpretation tout court. 
The general criticism of my proposals is that they have 
the appearance of being arbitrary. We have closure under 
certain logical operations but not others (for example, 
inclusive-or introduction). Why just the conditions that we 
have, and not others? 
To see the answer to this objection, we must remember 
how we got to those requirements. They were established 
on the basis of particular logical abilities that themselves 
were argued to be entailed by the fulfillment of certain 
general necessary conditions on being rational, in one 
sense of that term. If the arguments (for which I referred to 
another work of mine) that link the necessary conditions on 
rationality with the various logical abilities are good, this 
means that a theory of rational belief with these closure 
requirements should be a good method of interpretation for 
any creature that manifests that form of rationality - any 
creature, I argued, that is a remotely plausible candidate 
for interpretation. I have not argued that only these 
inferential abilities can be proven to be ‘universal’ on the 
basis of this conception of rationality, but I have not seen a 
way to establish the universality of others. If anyone can, 
then further closure requirements might be added to the 
theory of rational belief for the purposes of interpreting 
such creatures. Furthermore, if anyone can, by adding 
further conditions to the conception of rationality, establish 
the necessity of further inferential abilities, then a theory of 
rational belief, with additional closure requirements, can be 
developed for creatures satisfying that narrower concep-
tion of rationality. Such a conception of rationality may well 
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still be wide-enough to include any creature we may want 
to interpret, given the initial weakness of my own charac-
terization of rationality. 
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